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In the fair division literature, the problem of assigning rooms and dividing rent in an 
apartment has been well studied. In recent years, several solutions have been developed, 
all of which employ envy-freeness as a criterion of fairness. These room/rent allocation 
mechanisms are able to yield remarkably desirable outcomes. However, any such 
mechanism that achieves envy-free allocations necessarily provides agents with incentives 
to misreport their true preferences. In this paper, the author studies strategic behavior 
when preferences are private information under the most popular of these mechanisms: 
the online rent division program Spliddit. Best strategies are computed for a class of 
special cases of the game induced by Spliddit involving two players. A parameterized 
probability distribution is used to develop a solution for computing best strategies for a 
broad variety of given preference distributions. These solutions constitute Bayesian Nash 
Equilibria of the game induced by the mechanism. A conjecture for how these results 
generalize to larger numbers of rooms and players is developed.
